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Abstract
In this paper, we study fairness in committee selection problems. We consider a general
notion of fairness via stability: A committee is stable if no coalition of voters can deviate and
choose a committee of proportional size, so that all these voters strictly prefer the new committee
to the existing one. Our main contribution is to extend this definition to stability of a distribution
(or lottery) over committees. We consider two canonical voter preference models: theApproval
Set setting where each voter approves a set of candidates and prefers committees with larger
intersection with this set; and the Ranking setting where each voter ranks committees based
on how much she likes her favorite candidate in a committee. Our main result is to show
that stable lotteries always exist for these canonical preference models. Interestingly, given
preferences of voters over committees, the procedure for computing an approximately stable
lottery is the same for both models and therefore extends to the setting where some voters
have the former preference structure and others have the latter. Our existence proof uses the
probabilistic method and a new large deviation inequality that may be of independent interest.
1 Introduction
One of the central problems in social choice theory is committee selection, or multi-winner
elections. In this problem, there is a set of voters (or agents) N = [n] = {1, . . . , n}, and a set of
candidates C = [m]. A committee is a subset of candidates, and the goal is to find a committee of
given sizeK. Committee selection arises in choosing a parliament, in making group hiring decisions,
and in computer systems [16, 13]. A long line of recent literature [22, 18, 17, 2, 23, 3] has studied
the complexity and axiomatization of voting rules in this setting.
One classic objective in committee selection is fairness or proportionality: Every demographic
of voters should feel that they have been fairly represented. They should not have the incentive
to deviate and choose their own committee of proportionally smaller size which gives all of them
higher utility. In the typical setting where these demographic slices are not known upfront, the
notion of proportionality attempts to be fair to all subsets of voters. This general idea dates back
more than a century [7], and has recently received significant attention [6, 19, 5, 2, 23, 3]. In fact,
there are several elections, both at a group level and national level, that attempt to find committees
(or parliaments) that provide approximately proportional representation. For instance, the popular
Single Transferable Vote (STV) rule is used in parliamentary elections in Ireland and Australia,
and in several municipal elections in the USA. This rule attempts to find a proportional solution.
Fairness in committee selection arises in many other applications outside of social choice as well.
For example, consider a shared cache for data items in a multi-tenant cloud system, where each data
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item is used by several long-running applications [16, 13]. Each data item can be treated as a candi-
date, and each application as a voter whose utility for an item corresponds to the speedup obtained
by caching that item. In this context, we need a fair caching policy that provides proportional
speedup to all applications.
In this paper, we propose a new notion of proportionality in committee selection that generalizes
several previously considered notions. Our main contribution is to show that stable solutions always
exist for the stability notion that we propose, and such solutions can be computed efficiently. In
contrast, stable solutions may not exist for some of the previously studied notions, and for the
notions where stable solutions do exist, we do not know how to compute them efficiently (see
Section 1.5 for a detailed discussion).
1.1 Preference Models
Before proceeding further, we define the preference model of the voters for committees. We con-
sider two canonical ordinal preference models over committees, both of which have been extensively
studied in social choice literature.
Approval Set. In this model [5, 2, 23, 3], each voter v specifies an approval set Av ⊆ C of
candidates. Given two committees S1 and S2, S1 ≻v S2 iff |S1 ∩ Av| > |S2 ∩ Av|, i.e., the
voter strictly prefers committees in which she has more approved candidates.
Ranking. In this model [8], each voter v has a preference order over candidates in C. In this case,
S1 ≻v S2 iff v’s favorite candidate in S1 is ranked higher (in her preference ordering) than
her favorite candidate in S2. The Chamberlin-Courant voting rule [6] for committee selection
finds the social optimum assuming a cardinal preference function of this form.
These models have been extensively studied because it is relatively simple to elicit an approval
vote or a ranking over candidates. Viewed in terms of underlying cardinal utility functions1, both
these models are special cases of submodular utilities: Voter v has utility uv(S) for committee
S ⊆ C, where uv is a submodular set function. The voter prefers committees that give her larger
utility. The approval set case corresponds to uv(S) = fv(|S ∩Av|) for some increasing, concave
function fv. The ranking case can be modeled as follows: Voter v has utility uvk for candidate
k ∈ C, and we set uv(S) = maxk∈S uvk. The Chamberlin-Courant rule sets uvk = m − ℓ (i.e., the
Borda score) if candidate k is ranked at position ℓ by voter v.
1.2 Group Fairness via Stability
The notion of fairness we study is defined for arbitrary ordinal preferences over committees.
We study fairness via the notion of stability, which has been extensively studied (in similar or more
restricted forms) in economics [12, 24, 20] and computer science [9, 10, 2, 3]. We first define the
notion of capture count.
Definition 1 (Capture Count). Given two committees S1, S2 ⊆ C, the capture count of S2 over S1
is the number of voters who strictly prefer S2 to S1:
V (S1, S2) = |{v ∈ N | S2 ≻v S1}| .
We are now ready to define the notion of stability:
1Note that we do not elicit these cardinal utilities.
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Definition 2 (Stable Committees). Given a committee S ⊆ C of size K, we say that a committee
S′ ⊆ C blocks S iff
V (S, S′) ≥ |S
′|
K
· n .
For any 1 ≤ L ≤ K, a committee S is L-stable if there are no committees S′ of size at most L that
block it. We term K-stable as just “stable”.
In other words, for any sub-group of voters of size βn for some β ∈ (0, 1], the committee S
is fair in the sense that this sub-group cannot form another committee of size ⌊βK⌋ so that all
members of this sub-group are strictly better off. The notion of L-stability restricts this definition
to “small” subgroups with β ≤ LK .
The classical interpretation of this concept in Economics [12, 24, 20] is in terms of taxation:
Each voter has a dollar of money. If the goal is to find a committee of size K, we assume each
committee member has a cost of nK . A committee S of size K is stable if there is no subset of voters
who can deviate and “buy” another committee S′ using their share of money, so that all voters
in this deviating coalition are strictly better off with S′ than with S. Note that the amount of
money required to buy S′ is precisely |S
′|
K ·n, and the amount of money available with the deviating
coalition of voters who strictly prefer S′ to S is precisely the capture count V (S, S′). Therefore S′
is blocking if the deviating coalition of voters have sufficient funds to pay for S′.
Note that a stable outcome S is (weakly) Pareto-optimal among committees of size at most K;
if it were not, consider a Pareto-dominating committee S′. Since V (S, S′) = n, the committee S′
would be blocking, which contradicts the stability of S. In fact, it says something stronger: For
every coalition of voters, a stable committee is also Pareto-optimal relative to committees whose
size is suitably scaled down. Stability also logically implies other notions of stability considered in
multi-winner election literature. For instance, the special case of 1-stability has been extensively
studied as justified representation, and we discuss these connections further in Section 1.5.
In theRanking setting, we can make the following simple observation: V (S, S′) ≤∑j∈S′ V (S, j),
since each deviating voter v prefers S′ because of her favorite candidate in it. Therefore, by an
averaging argument, if S′ blocks S, then so does at least one j ∈ S′. This immediately gives the
following observation:
Observation 1. In the Ranking setting, a committee is stable iff it is 1-stable.
1.3 Stable Lotteries and Approximate Stability
Given the strength of the definition, it is no surprise that stable committees may not exist for
the ranking setting. Consider the following example with cyclic preferences:
Example 1. There are n = 6 voters {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and m = 6 candidates {a, b, c, d, e, f}. We
need to choose a committee of size K = 3. The rankings of the voters are as follows:
Voter Preferences
1 a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d  e  f
2 b ≻ c ≻ a ≻ d  e  f
3 c ≻ a ≻ b ≻ d  e  f
4 d ≻ e ≻ f ≻ a  b  c
5 e ≻ f ≻ d ≻ a  b  c
6 f ≻ d ≻ e ≻ a  b  c
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Note that any committee chooses either at most one candidate from {a, b, c} or at most one candidate
from {d, e, f}. Assume w.l.o.g. that the former happens, and candidate a is chosen (or no one in
{a, b, c} is chosen). Then voters {2, 3} can deviate and choose candidate c. Therefore, there is no
stable committee on this example.
In light of this impossibility result, we extend Definition 2 to allow randomization in choosing the
committee. Given a committee size K, we let ∆ denote a distribution (or lottery) over committees
of size K. Our first contribution is the following definition of stable lotteries.
Definition 3 (Stable Lotteries). A distribution (or lottery) ∆ over committees of size K is said to
be L-stable (1 ≤ L ≤ K) iff for all committees S′ ⊆ C with |S′| ≤ L, we have:
ES∼∆
[
V (S, S′)
]
<
|S′|
K
· n .
We term K-stable lotteries as just “stable”.
In the taxation interpretation, the above definition says the following: For any committee S′, if
in every realization S of ∆, the voters who strictly prefer S′ over S pay for S′, then in expectation
there is not enough money to pay for S′. This justifies why the voters do not deviate to S′ given ∆.
Further, we note that implementing a lottery is feasible in several computer systems applications.
For instance, consider for example caching data items that are shared by several applications
discussed above. In this context, a lottery over possible cache allocations can be implemented by
splitting time into chunks, and caching the allocations in the lottery in different chunks of time.
We note for the Ranking setting, Observation 1 extends to lotteries because
ES∼∆
[
V (S, S′)
] ≤ ∑
j∈S′
ES∼∆ [V (S, j)] .
Observation 2. In the Ranking setting, a lottery is stable iff it is 1-stable.
Approximate Stability. We next define approximately stable lotteries; this notion will play an
important role in our computational results.
Definition 4 (ǫ-approximate Stability). For any ǫ > 0, a distribution ∆ over committees of size
K is said to be ǫ-approximately L-stable if for all committees S′ ⊆ C with |S′| ≤ L, we have:
ES∼∆
[
V (S, S′)
] ≤ (1 + ǫ) |S′|
K
· n .
We term ǫ-approximately K-stable lotteries as just ǫ-approximately stable.
1.4 Our Results
Our main result in this paper is the following theorem, which states that a stable lottery always
exists and it is reasonably tractable. Recall that (as in Definition 3) a lottery is L-stable if there
are no committees of size at most L that block it, and stable lotteries refer to K-stable lotteries.
Theorem 1 (Main). In both the approval set and ranking settings with m candidates, for any
committee size K, a stable lottery over committees of size K always exists. Furthermore, for any
ǫ > 0, an ǫ-approximately L-stable lottery can be computed in poly
(
mL, 1ǫ
)
time.
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Note that when combined with Observation 1, this implies a running time of poly
(
m, 1ǫ
)
to
find an ǫ-approximately stable lottery in the Ranking setting. Interestingly, assuming we can
ask voters to compare any two committees, the algorithm for the Approval set and Ranking
settings are exactly the same, and as the number of voters becomes large, the average number of
queries asked to any individual voter goes to zero. Since the algorithm is the same in both cases,
as a simple corollary, it also shows the existence of a stable solution when there is a mix of voters
in the population, some with Approval set preferences and others with Ranking preferences.
We note that Theorem 1 does not follow by analyzing extant voting rules. For instance, in the
approval set setting, Aziz et al. [2] showed that the voting rule, Proportional Approval Voting
(PAV) [25, 3], that satisfies justified representation, fails to find a stable outcome. In PAV, if voter
v approves rv candidates in the committee, this voter is assigned a score sv = 1 +
1
2 + · · · + 1rv ;
the winning committee maximizes
∑
v sv. We strengthen their example to show that PAV cannot
find better than an O(
√
K)-approximately stable committee (Theorem 3 in Section 3). Further,
as mentioned above, deterministic stability is simply not possible for the ranking setting, which
rules out trying to prove the above result via analyzing any deterministic voting rule. In that sense,
we find the existence of stable lotteries quite surprising.
Though not the main focus of the paper, we finally consider the existence of deterministic
stable committees in the approval set setting. We make progress on this question and show that
when the committee size is K ≤ 3, a stable committee always exists (Theorem 2 in Section 3).
Prior to this, the only results known (even for K = 3) were the existence of committees that are
approximately stable [10].
Techniques. The most interesting aspect of Theorem 1 is its proof, which uses the probabilistic
method. We show that the question of whether stable lotteries exist reduces to deciding if a
zero-sum game has negative value. The dual problem involves finding a stable solution given a
lottery over blocking committees. We show its existence by developing a rounding procedure for the
dual problem. This procedure performs probability matching, and simply chooses candidates with
probability proportional to their marginal probability in the blocking lottery. We then argue that
this rounding procedure always has negative expected value. Showing this for the Approval set
setting requires proving a new deviation inequality (Lemma 1) for sums of random variables.
Lemma 1 (Probability Matching Lemma). Let X be the sum of independent Bernoulli random
variables: X = X1+X2+ · · ·+Xn where Xi ∼ Bernoulli(1, pi). Let Y be any non-negative integer
random variable with E[Y ] ≤ βE[X]. Then,
Pr[X < Y ] < β .
Since we need each committee in the lottery to have size K, we combine this large deviation
inequality with dependent rounding techniques [14] to preserve committee size. This rounding
procedure can be plugged in as an oracle to the multiplicative weight update method [1], yielding
the desired running time for the computational problem of finding an L-stable lottery. We believe
the template of our proofs via large deviation inequalities and probabilistic method may find further
applications in the emerging theory of fair allocations.
RoadMap. We present the proof of Theorem 1 in Section 2. We split this proof into a generic
rounding portion (Sections 2.1 and 2.2) and the subsequent part that is specific to Approval set
(Section 2.3) and Ranking (Section 2.4). We present an efficient implementation in Section 2.5.
In Section 3, we consider the notion of deterministic stability. We show the existence of stable
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committees for K = 3, and show that the PAV rule cannot be better than O(
√
K)-approximately
stable. We conclude with open questions in Section 4.
1.5 Related Work
We now compare our notion of stability with other notions of stability and fairness extant in
literature. We first note that there is a rich literature on using lotteries to achieve fairness, including
the influential papers of Hylland and Zeckhauser [15] and Bogomolnaia and Moulin [4]. Our work
is more in the spirit of the latter in the sense that our model does not require voters to specify
cardinal utilities over committees.
The Lindahl Equilibrium. Our notion of stability is inspired by the notion of core in coopera-
tive game theory and was first phrased in game theoretic terms by Scarf [24]. It has been extensively
studied in public goods settings [12, 20, 9]. Much of this literature considers convex preferences,
which translates to voters having preferences over lotteries, and deviating to another lottery if their
expected utility increases. In other words, for additive utility functions uv, we say a lottery ∆
′
blocks ∆ if there is a coalition of voters of size at least n · |S′|/K such that for all voters v in this
coalition, we have:
ES′∼∆′
[
uv(S
′)
] ≥ ES∼∆ [uv(S)]
with at least one inequality strict. This notion builds on the seminal work of Foley [12] on the
Lindahl market equilibrium. In this equilibrium, each candidate is assigned a per-voter price. If
the voters choose their utility maximizing allocation subject to spending a dollar, then (1) they
all choose the same outcome; and (2) for each chosen candidate, the total money collected pays
for that candidate. It can be shown via a fixed point argument that such an equilibrium pricing
always exists when lotteries are allowed, and is a core outcome. Though this existence result is
very general, holding for any compact convex set of preferences, it is not known how to compute
such a core outcome efficiently even for the committee selection problem with ranking or approval
set utilities.
Our notion of stability coincides with the notion of core if no randomization is allowed, but
our notion of stable lotteries differs from how randomization is used in the core. In a Lindahl
equilibrium, the voter compares the expected utility from the lottery with the utility on deviation,
while in our notion, the lottery is first realized and subsequently the voters who see higher utility
will deviate. In a sense, our notion justifies to any coalition of candidates that they do not have
enough support given the current lottery, while the Lindahl equilibrium justifies to each coalition
of voters that their utility is Pareto-optimal. This difference is subtle, but makes the two notions
incomparable – the existence of one type of stable solution does not imply the other in any obvious
way.
Our approach has two key advantages. First, our notion only requires voters to specify ordinal
preferences over committees, and not over lotteries. Note that for both approval set and rank-
ing settings, preferences over committees do not automatically imply preferences over lotteries –
the latter must be explicitly specified via the choice of utility function. Secondly, our existence
theorems, though specific to committee selection, have constructive proofs that lead to efficient
algorithms (while fixed point arguments in general do not). For instance, we can compute a sta-
ble lottery for Ranking in polynomial time, while we do not know how to compute a Lindahl
equilibrium efficiently in this setting.
Proportional Fairness. A different notion of stability is the following: A deviating coalition of
voters gets to choose a committee of size K, but its utility is scaled down proportional to the size
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of the coalition. In other words, given a coalition of voters of size βn, a committee S′ of size K is
blocking to a lottery ∆ if for all voters v in the coalition,
βuv(S
′) ≥ ES∼∆ [uv(S)]
with at least one inequality strict. In this notion, it is relatively easy to show that maximizing the
Nash product of voter utilities finds a stable lottery [9]; furthermore, the discrete analog of Nash
welfare, proportional approval voting (PAV), finds an approximately stable solution for additive
utilities [10]. Though this approach is computationally tractable, it explicitly needs voters to have
cardinal utilities, and is otherwise incomparable to scaling down the committee size. Our notion
is closer to how fairness has been thought about in the Economics literature on public goods, and
to how it has been thought about in the multi-winner election literature. We have already delved
into the former; we consider the latter next.
Justified Representation. Deterministic stability in the approval set setting logically im-
plies a number of fairness notions considered in multi-winner election literature with approval set
preferences, such as justified representation, extended justified representation [2], and proportional
justified representation [23, 3]. The idea behind all these proportional representation axioms is
to define a notion of cohesive groups of agents that all approve a small set of candidates, and
ensure that such groups of voters do not deviate, i.e., that these groups are proportionally rep-
resented in the outcome. As mentioned above, justified representation is exactly the same as our
1-stability. Similarly, in extended justified representation (EJR), we only consider deviations by
sub-populations of voters of size at least αn, if they all approve the same set of ⌊αK⌋ candidates.
Therefore, a committee S satisfies EJR iff some voter in this sub-population approves at least ⌊αK⌋
in S.
Unlike justified representation and its generalizations, stability is a general condition that holds
for all coalitions of agents, not just those that are cohesive. We do pay a price for this generalization:
our stability results are for lotteries of committees, and unlike justified representation and EJR, our
algorithm for computing stable lotteries runs in polynomial time only when the deviating committee
has constant size. As noted before, it is an open question whether (deterministic) stable committees
exist in the approval set setting.
Committee Scoring Rules. Elkind et al. [8] show that given preferences of voters over candi-
dates, a large class of voting rules for committee selection can be expressed as follows: For each
voter, sort the positions of the committee members in its own ranking in non-decreasing order.
Now apply a monotone scoring function to this vector of positions, and add up this score for all
voters. The winning committee maximizes this score. This can be interpreted as assigning a utility
function for each voter for each committee, and finding the committee that maximizes the sum of
utilities over all voters, i.e., the social optimum. In the ranking setting, the voter derives utility
only from the most preferred candidate in the committee; in fact, the Chamberlin-Courant voting
rule [6] sums over all the voters, the Borda score of that voter’s highest ranked candidate in the
committee, and chooses the committee with the highest score. Other voting rules such as k-Borda
assume more general submodular utilities, and it is an open question whether stable lotteries exist
when voters’ utilities are submodular.
Elkind et al. [8] also show that for several natural scoring functions including Chamberlin-
Courant, the resulting voting rule is NP-Hard. Further, since these voting rules are deterministic,
none of them can produce a stable outcome. Our contribution is to show that for the ranking
setting, stable lotteries always exists and can be computed in polynomial time.
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2 Existence of Stable Lotteries
In this section, we will prove Theorem 1. We will do this in a sequence of steps. First, we
will formulate stability as a zero-sum game, and take its dual. Next, we will devise a rounding
procedure to show the dual has negative value, which will imply the existence of a stable solution.
Though the rounding procedure is the same for both Approval set and ranking settings, we
need different proofs of existence for each. In Section 2.5, we show that the rounding procedure
also gives an efficient algorithm for finding an ǫ-approximately stable lottery via the multiplicative
weight method.
2.1 Dual Formulation of Stability
Recall the definition of a stable lottery from Definition 3. The existence of a stable lottery is
equivalent to showing that:
min
∆
max
S′
(
ES∼∆
[
V (S, S′)
]− n |S′|
K
)
< 0 (1)
where ∆ is a lottery over committees of size K.
We formulate a zero-sum game with an attacker and defender. The goal of the defender is to
choose a stable committee, while the goal of the attacker is to find a blocking committee. The
defender’s pure strategies are committees Sd of size exactly K, and the attacker’s pure strategies
are committees Sa of size at most K. Denote the former set of strategies as Sd and the latter by
Sa. Given a pair of pure strategies (Sd, Sa) the payoff to the attacker is:
Q(Sd, Sa) = V (Sd, Sa)− n |Sa|
K
.
and the defender tries to minimize this value.
Therefore, the LHS of Equation (1) is the value of the game if the defender goes first and chooses
mixed strategy ∆d, and the attacker subsequently chooses strategy Sa to maximize the value of the
game. Therefore, the existence of a stable lottery is equivalent to asking whether the value of this
zero-sum game is negative.
Dual Formulation. Suppose the attacker goes first and chooses a lottery ∆a over Sa. Subse-
quently, the defender chooses a committee Sd ∈ Sd to minimize the value of the game. Using
duality in zero-sum games,
min
∆d
max
Sa∈Sa
ESd∼∆d [Q(Sd, Sa)] = max
∆a
min
Sd∈Sd
ESa∼∆a [Q(Sd, Sa)] .
Define β =
ESa∼∆a [|Sa|]
K . Note that β ∈ (0, 1] because ∆a is a lottery over Sa, i.e., over commit-
tees of size at most K. Then, we have:
ESa∼∆a
[
V (Sd, Sa)− n |Sa|
K
]
=
∑
v∈N
(
Pr
Sa∼∆a
[Sa ≻v Sd]
)
− βn =
∑
v∈N
(
Pr
Sa∼∆a
[Sa ≻v Sd]− β
)
.
Therefore, the value of the game is:
max
∆a
min
Sd∈Sd
ESa∼∆a [Q(Sd, Sa)] = max
∆a
min
Sd∈Sd
(∑
v∈N
(
Pr
Sa∼∆a
[Sa ≻v Sd]− β
))
. (2)
In order to prove the existence part of Theorem 1, we need to show that the RHS of the above
identity is negative for the approval set and ranking settings.
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2.2 Defender’s Strategy: Probability Matching
Fix any mixed strategy ∆a for the attacker. Let β =
ESa∼∆a [|Sa|]
K . We will construct a mixed
defending strategy ∆d over Sd, i.e. over committees of size K, so that
∀v ∈ N Pr
Sa∼∆a,Sd∼∆d
[Sa ≻v Sd] < β . (3)
Equations (2) and (3) together show the existence of a defending strategy Sd that makes the
attacker’s payoff negative:
min
Sd∈Sd
ESa∼∆a [Q(Sd, Sa)] ≤ ESd∼∆dESa∼∆a [Q(Sd, Sa)] =
∑
v∈N
(
Pr
Sa∼∆a,Sd∼∆d
[Sa ≻v Sd]− β
)
< 0 .
Because such Sd exists for any mixed attacking strategy ∆a, the value of the game is negative, and
hence a stable lottery always exists.
Probability Matching. We will construct the mixed defending strategy using probability match-
ing. For candidate i ∈ C, let random variable Yi = 1i∈Sa be the indicator variable for the event
i ∈ Sa when Sa ∼ ∆a, and let pi = E[Yi] = PrSa∼∆a [i ∈ Sa]. Note that the inclusion of different
candidates in the attacking strategy can be correlated, i.e., the Yi’s can be correlated.
Let qi = min(1, pi/β). The defender’s strategy will include i ∈ Sd with probability at least qi,
i.e., the defender will probability match the attacker for each candidate i ∈ C. We first make a
simple observation.
Claim 1.
∑
i∈C qi ≤ K.
Proof. The expected size of the attacker committee is βK, so
∑
i pi = βK. Therefore,∑
i
qi =
∑
i
min(1, pi/β) ≤
∑
i
pi/β = K .
Randomized Dependent Rounding. We first increase q arbitrarily to α so that
∑
i αi = K
and αi ∈ [qi, 1] for all i ∈ C. We will construct a mixed defending strategy ∆d over committees
Sd of size K by performing randomized dependent rounding [14] on α. Let random variable Xi be
the indicator variable for the event i ∈ Sd when Sd ∼ ∆d. We omit the details of this rounding
procedure, and instead summarize its properties in the following lemma:
Lemma 2 (Gandhi et al. [14]). The distribution ∆d obtained by performing randomized dependent
rounding on α satisfies the following:
1. ∆d is a distribution over committees of size K, i.e., for every Sd ∼ ∆d we have |Sd| = K.
2. Pr[Xi = 1] = αi, i.e., the marginal probability of choosing candidate i is preserved.
3. The random variables Xi are negatively correlated. More specifically, for every subset S ⊆ C,
Pr
[∧
i∈S
Xi = b
]
≤
∏
i∈S
Pr[Xi = b] ∀b ∈ {0, 1} .
This completes the generic portion of the proof that there exists a stable lottery over committees.
It remains to show that the defender’s lottery ∆d we constructed satisfies Inequality (3). We will
show this separately for the Approval set and ranking settings.
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2.3 Proof of Theorem 1 for Approval Set Setting
We will now show Inequality (3) holds for the Approval set setting. As we show later, this
statement is a stronger version of the Probability Matching Lemma (Lemma 1), where we replace
independence of {Xi} by negative dependence.
Fix any voter v ∈ N with approval set Av. By the definition of Approval Set:
Pr
Sa∼∆a,Sd∼∆d
[Sa ≻v Sd] = Pr
Sa∼∆a,Sd∼∆d
[|Sa ∩Av| > |Sd ∩Av|] .
Suppose Av = {c1, c2, . . . , cℓ, cℓ+1, . . . , cr}. We simplify notation to denote αi = αci . These candi-
dates are ordered so that αi’s are in ascending order. Further, αℓ < 1 and αℓ+1 = αℓ+2 = · · · =
αr = 1. Since cℓ+1, . . . , cr are selected in Sd with probability 1,
Pr [|Sd ∩Av| < |Sa ∩Av|] ≤ Pr [|Sd ∩ {c1, . . . , cℓ}| < |Sa ∩ {c1, . . . , cℓ}|] .
Defining Td := Sd ∩ {c1, . . . , cℓ} and Ta := Sa ∩ {c1, . . . , cℓ}, we have
Pr
Sa∼∆a,Sd∼∆d
[Sa ≻v Sd] ≤ Pr [|Td| < |Ta|] . (4)
In order to show Inequality (3), our goal is therefore to show that Pr [|Td| < |Ta|] < β.
Recall that Yi is the indicator random variable for whether ci ∈ Sa when Sa ∼ ∆a, and similarly,
Xi is the indicator random variable for whether ci ∈ Sd when Sd ∼ ∆d. The Yi’s can be correlated
and E[Yi] = pi. For i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ℓ}, by Lemma 2, we have E[Xi] = αi ≥ pi/β and the Xi’s are
negatively correlated. Define random variables X =
∑ℓ
i=1Xi and Y =
∑ℓ
i=1 Yi.
Using these notations, our goal is to prove
Pr [|Td| < |Ta|] = Pr [X < Y ] < β .
The next lemma uses Chernoff bound to upper bound the probability that X < η.
Lemma 3. Let X =
∑ℓ
i=1Xi and µ = E[X]. For any integer η ≥ 1, Pr[X < η] < ηµ .
Proof. The statement holds trivially when η ≥ µ, so w.l.o.g. we can assume 1 ≤ η < µ. Because η
is an integer, Pr[X < η] = Pr[X ≤ η − 1].
By Lemma 2, theXi’s produced by randomized dependent rounding [14] is negatively correlated,
so we can apply Chernoff bound to the Xi’s [21, 14]:
Pr[X ≤ η − 1] = Pr
[
X ≤
(
η − 1
µ
)
µ
]
≤ exp
(
−1
2
(
1− η − 1
µ
)2
µ
)
.
It remains to show that the RHS is less than ηµ for any µ > 0 and any integer 1 ≤ η < µ. One
way to do so is to fix the ratio r = ηµ ∈ (0, 1) and first minimize the RHS over µ = ηr ≥ 1r .
Let f(µ) = (1− r+ 1µ)2µ. We can compute its derivative: f ′(µ) = (1− r)2 − 1µ2 . Thus, f(µ) is
decreasing when 0 < µ ≤ 11−r and increasing when µ ≥ 11−r .
When r ≥ 12 , we have minµ≥ 1
r
f(µ) = f( 11−r ) = 4(1− r), which implies RHS ≤ exp
(
−4(1−r)2
)
<
r. When r ≤ 12 , we have 1r ≥ 11−r , so minµ≥ 1
r
f(µ) = f(1r ) =
1
r and RHS ≤ exp
(− 12r) < r.
Given Lemma 3, we can prove Inequality (3) by considering all possible values of Y :
Pr[X < Y ] =
ℓ∑
η=1
Pr[Y = η] · Pr[X < η] <
ℓ∑
η=1
Pr[Y = η]
η
E[X]
=
E[Y ]
E[X]
≤ β .
The last step follows from the fact that E[X] =
∑ℓ
i=1 αi ≥
∑ℓ
i=1 pi/β = E[Y ]/β. This completes
the proof that a stable lottery exists in the Approval Set setting.
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Discussion. The above proof also proves Lemma 1. Recall that Lemma 1 states that
Pr [X < Y ] < β
where X is the sum of independent Bernoulli random variables and Y is a non-negative integer
random variable. Now since E[Y ] ≤ βE[X], a simple application of Markov’s inequality yields:
Pr [E[X] < Y ] < β .
However, this is not quite what we want. The quantity X =
∑
iXi is the sum of independent
Bernoulli random variables, and will deviate below its expectation. The proof in Section 2.3 varies
the threshold η, and uses Chernoff bound to upper bound the probability that X deviates below η.
The probability matching approach chooses candidates in Sd (i.e., the variablesXi) proportional
to the marginals of the correlated distribution ∆a (i.e., the variables Yi). This is similar to the
randomized contention resolution scheme for approximately maximizing submodular welfare [11].
However, this resemblance is superficial. First, we do not round with probability equal to the
marginal, but instead need to scale it up by 1/β. More importantly, the analysis for submodular
welfare focuses on achieving a constant approximation against an LP bound, i.e., they show that
when β = 1, then E[f(X)] ≥ (1 − 1/e)E[f(Y )] for submodular function f . On the other hand,
we show a more delicate statement Pr
[∑ℓ
i=1 Yi >
∑ℓ
i=1Xi
]
< β. In fact, we can modify the tight
example in [11] to show that for this specific rounding procedure, the statement Pr [f(Y ) > f(X)] <
β is false for arbitrary submodular functions f . This implies our probability matching procedure
cannot be used to show the existence of stable lotteries when utilities of voters for committees are
submodular. It is an open question to extend this proof to the case where the Xi ∼ Bernoulli(si, αi),
which corresponds to the voters having arbitrary additive utilities for candidates.
2.4 Proof of Theorem 1 for Ranking Setting
We now prove Inequality (3) for the Ranking setting. Fix any voter v ∈ N . Assume the
candidates are ordered so that c1 ≻v c2 ≻v · · · ≻v cm. Let Xi denote the indicator random variable
that the defender’s committee Sd ∼ ∆d includes ci, and let Yi denote the indicator random variable
that the attacker’s committee Sa ∼ ∆a includes ci.
Recall that the Xi’s are negatively correlated and Yi’s can be arbitrarily correlated, E[Yi] = pi,
and E[Xi] = αi ≥ min(1, pi/β). Let cℓ denote the earliest (highest ranked) candidate in this
ordering for whom αℓ = 1, i.e., Xℓ = 1 with probability 1. Note that for 1 ≤ j < ℓ, we have αj < 1
and thus αj ≥ pj/β.
Let cj be the highest ranked candidate picked by the attacker. That is, j is a random variable
which is the smallest index with Yj = 1. Then, Sa ≻v Sd iff X1 = X2 = · · · = Xj = 0, i.e., the
defender fails to pick any candidate that ranks at least as high as j.
Because the defender will always pick cℓ, for Sa ≻v Sd to happen, the attacker’s highest ranked
candidate has to appear before cℓ (i.e., j < ℓ). Therefore,
Pr[Sa ≻v Sd] =
ℓ−1∑
j=1
Pr [Y1 = Y2 = · · · = Yj−1 = 0 and Yj = 1 and X1 = X2 = · · · = Xj = 0]
≤
ℓ−1∑
j=1
Pr [Yj = 1 and X1 = X2 = · · · = Xj = 0] .
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Since {Xi} is independent of {Yi}, we have:
Pr[Sa ≻v Sd] ≤
ℓ−1∑
j=1
Pr [Yj = 1] · Pr [X1 = X2 = · · · = Xj = 0]
≤
ℓ−1∑
j=1
Pr [Yj = 1] · Pr[X1 = 0]Pr[X2 = 0] · · ·Pr[Xj = 0]
≤
ℓ−1∑
j=1
βαj
j∏
i=1
(1− αi) .
Here, the second inequality follows from the negative correlation of {Xi}. More precisely, this
inequality is a special case of the negative correlation condition of Lemma 2. The final inequality
follows since E[Yi] = pi ≤ βαi, and E[Xi] = αi.
Consider the following stopping process: Consider candidates in order c1, c2, . . . , cℓ. We stop at
candidate c1 with probability α1; if we do not stop, we stop at c2 independently with probability
α2, and so on. Because αj < 1 for all 1 ≤ j < ℓ, we stop with probability less than 1 before we
reach cℓ:
ℓ−1∑
j=1
αj
j−1∏
i=1
(1− αi) < 1 .
Comparing this inequality with the previously obtained bound, we have:
Pr[Sa ≻v Sd] ≤
ℓ−1∑
j=1
βαj
j∏
i=1
(1− αi) ≤ β
ℓ−1∑
j=1
αj
j−1∏
i=1
(1− αi) < β .
This completes the proof of Inequality (3) for the Ranking setting.
2.5 Computing Stable Lotteries Efficiently
In this section, we turn to the problem of computing a stable lottery efficiently, and prove
the algorithmic part of Theorem 1. We will show a running time of poly(mL, 1/ǫ) to compute an
ǫ-approximately L-stable lottery (see Definition 3). This yields a polynomial running time for L-
stable lotteries for constant L in the Approval set setting, and for stable lotteries in the Ranking
setting. Since our algorithm is the same for both Approval set and Ranking settings (assuming
voters have the ability to compare two committees); it also yields a stable lottery when there is a
mix of voters, some with Approval set and others with Ranking preferences.
First observe that since the size of the strategy sets Sd and Sa are O(mK), and since all we
are doing is solving a zero-sum game, there is clearly a poly(n,mK) time algorithm. The key
observation is that the randomized dependent rounding procedure allows us to compute a defender
strategy efficiently, and this allows us to compute L-stable lotteries in time that depends on mL
instead of mK . We then combine this with estimating the V (S, S′) values by sampling voters and
asking them to compare S and S′, thereby eliminating the dependence of the running time on n.
Since the details follow from fairly standard ideas, we only outline the argument.
Given a lottery ∆a over Sa, let Oracle(∆a, ǫ) be a procedure that finds Sd ∈ Sd such that
Rǫ(Sd,∆a) ≡ ESa∼∆a
[
V (Sd, Sa)− (1 + ǫ)n |Sa|
K
]
< 0 .
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Claim 2. For ǫ ∈ (0, 1/5), Oracle(∆a, ǫ) can be implemented in expected time poly
(
mL, 1ǫ
)
, and
is correct with high probability.
Proof. First note that given ∆a, the randomized dependent rounding procedure in [14] can be
implemented in O(m2) time. The randomized dependent rounding outputs a distribution ∆d that
satisfies ETd∼∆d [R0(Td,∆a)] < 0. We have:
ETd∼∆d [ESa∼∆a [V (Td, Sa)]] ≤ ESa∼∆a
[
n
|Sa|
K
]
.
By Markov’s inequality, we have:
Pr
Td∼∆d
[
ESa∼∆a [V (Td, Sa)] ≥ (1 + ǫ)ESa∼∆a
[
n
|Sa|
K
]]
<
1
1 + ǫ
. (5)
Given an output Td of randomized dependent rounding, for each Sa of size at most L, we can
estimate V (Td, Sa) to within an additive
ǫn
K as Vˆ (Td, Sa), by sampling poly(m,
1
ǫ ) voters and asking
them to compare Td with Sa. This allows us to estimate ESa∼∆a [V (Td, Sa)] to within an additive
ǫn
K with high probability in poly(m
L, 1ǫ ) time, since the support of ∆a has size O(m
L). Since the
entire algorithm takes poly(m, 1/ǫ) steps, we can therefore assume that with probability at least
1− 1/m, our estimate of any V (Td, Sa) is accurate for all steps of the algorithm. Call the resulting
estimate of Rǫ(Td,∆a), where each V (Td, Sa) is estimated by sampling, as Rˆǫ(Td,∆a).
We first show that for Td ∼ ∆d, the event Rˆ2ǫ(Td,∆a) < 0 happens with probability at least ǫ/2.
Inequality (5) implies Rǫ(Td,∆a) < 0 with probability at least
ǫ
1+ǫ . When this event happens, we
have R2ǫ(Td,∆a) ≤ Rǫ(Td,∆a)− ǫnK < − ǫnK . Since our sampled estimates of ESa∼∆a [V (Td, Sa)] are
accurate within an additive ǫnK with high probability, we have Rˆ2ǫ(Td,∆a) ≤ R2ǫ(Td,∆a) + ǫnK < 0.
Therefore, if the randomized dependent rounding procedure is repeated till Rˆ2ǫ(Td,∆a) < 0,
it takes poly
(
1
ǫ
)
trials in expectation. We conclude the proof by noting that the resulting Td is
a feasible solution for Oracle(∆a, 3ǫ) with high probability: R3ǫ(Td,∆a) ≤ R2ǫ(Td,∆a) − ǫnK ≤
Rˆ2ǫ(Td,∆a) < 0.
We now use the multiplicative weight update (MWU) method [1] in a standard fashion:
1. Given the adversary’s strategy ∆ta at time t, run Oracle(∆
t
a, ǫ) to compute S
t
d satisfying
Rǫ(S
t
d,∆
t
a) < 0.
2. Treat each committee Sa of size at most L as an expert, and set its gain to be g
t(Sa) =
V (Std, Sa)− (1+ ǫ)n |Sa|K . Again, these gains can be approximately computed by sampling the
voters and asking them to compare Std and Sa.
3. Feed these gains to the MWU algorithm, which outputs a lottery ∆t+1a over the experts.
By a standard analysis, if we run the procedure for T = poly
(
m, 1ǫ
)
steps, the lottery ∆d that
chooses Std for t = 1, 2, . . . , T with equal probability will be an ǫ
′-approximately L-stable lottery
for ǫ′ = O(ǫ). Further, the algorithm only involves asking voters to compare two committees, and
is hence the same for both Approval set and Ranking.
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3 Deterministic Stability for Approval set Setting
So far, we have considered existence of stable lotteries. As mentioned earlier, for the Approval
set setting, the existence of stable (deterministic) committees is a tantalizing open question. In this
section, we present some results that make progress towards the goal of finding stable committees.
First, we show that stable committees always exist when the committee size is K ≤ 3, regardless of
the number of candidates and voters. In addition, we show that the PAV rule that satisfies justified
representation, fails to find any non-trivial approximation to stable committees. This strengthens
the negative result in [2] to include inapproximability.
3.1 Existence of Stable Committees When K = 3
The next theorem states that for approval set setting and K = 3, stable committee always
exists and can be computed efficiently. Recall that m is the number of candidates, n is the number
of voters, and V (S, S′) is the number of voters who prefer committee S′ over S.
Theorem 2. In the approval set setting, for committee size K = 3, a stable committee always
exists. Moreover, it can be computed in time O(m3n).
Proof. For a committee S, we use ni(S) for the number of voters who approve exactly i candidates
in S, and we use n≥i(S) for the number of voters who approve at least i candidates in S.
First observe that it is sufficient to find committee T with no blocking committees of size 1 or
2. This is because either T is stable, or it has blocking committees of size 3 that Pareto-dominate
T . Consider any Pareto-optimal committee T ′ that Pareto-dominates T . T ′ is stable because it
has no blocking committees of size 3 due to its Pareto-optimality; and since T ′ makes all voters
happier than they were under T , T ′ has no blocking committees of size 1 or 2 either.
The rest of the proof shows that such committee T always exists via the following case analysis:
1. There exists a committee S = {a, b} such that n2(S) > n3 .
2. There are no committees of size 2 that satisfy (1), but there exists a committee S = {a, b}
such that n≥1(S) ≥ 2n3 .
3. There are no committees of size 2 that satisfy (1) or (2).
For Case (1), assume w.l.o.g. that S has a blocking committee of size 1 or 2. (Otherwise
we can choose T = S.) However, any committee S′ of size 2 is not blocking, because v(S, S′) ≤
n− n2(S) < 2n3 . Therefore, it must be the case that there is a blocking committee S′ = {c} of size
one. We add c to S and consider the committee T = {a, b, c}. Note that n≥2(T ) ≥ n2(S) > n3 ,
and n1(T ) ≥ v(S, {c}) ≥ n3 because voters who prefer {c} over S must approve c but not anyone in
S = {a, b}. We argue that T satisfies our requirements, because for any committee T ′ of size 2, we
have V (T, T ′) ≤ n−n≥2(T ) < 2n3 ; and for any committee T ′ of size 1, we have V (T, T ′) ≤ n0(T ) =
n− n≥2(T )− n1(T ) < n3 .
For Case (2), assume w.l.o.g. there is a candidate c with v(S, {c}) > 0. Consider the committee
T = {a, b, c}. Note that n≥1(T ) = n≥1(S) + V (S, {c}) > 2n3 . We argue that T satisfies our
requirements, because for any T ′ of size 1, we have v(T, T ′) ≤ n0(T ) = n − n≥1(T ) < n3 ; and for
any T ′ of size 2, we have V (T, T ′) ≤ n2(T ′) + n0(T ) < 2n3 . The last inequality is because voters
who prefer T ′ over T must either approve 2 candidates in T ′, or approve 0 candidates in T ; and
n2(T
′) ≤ n3 since we are not in Case (1).
Finally, in Case (3), there are no blocking committee T ′ of size 2 because V (∅, T ′) = n≥1(T
′) <
2n
3 . This allows us to focus only on blocking committees of size 1. There is w.l.o.g. some candidate
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a such that V (∅, {a}) ≥ n3 , otherwise we can set T = ∅. Then again, there is w.l.o.g. some
candidate b such that V ({a}, {b}) ≥ n3 , otherwise we can set T = {a}. However, this contradicts
the assumption that we are in Case (3), because n≥1({a, b}) = V (∅, {a}) + V ({a}, {b}) ≥ 2n3 .
It takes time O(m2n) to find a committee T with no size 1 and 2 blocking committees. This
can be done by enumerating all committees of size 2 in time O(m2n) to decide which case we are
in, and then the bottleneck is Case (1) in which we can find a blocking committee of size 1 in
time O(mn). Starting from T , we can find a stable solution T ′ in time O(m3n) by enumerating
all committees of size 3 and maintaining the current Pareto-optimal solution. Hence, the overall
running time is O(m2n+mn+m3n) = O(m3n).
3.2 Proportional Approval Voting Can Be Far From Stable
Recall that the PAV rule works as follows: For any committee S, suppose voter v approves r
candidates in S, then we set the score qv(S) = 1+
1
2+ · · ·+ 1r . The PAV rule finds S that maximizes∑
v qv(S). We show that the PAV rule cannot be better than O(
√
K)-approximately stable.
Theorem 3. In the approval set setting, the PAV rule may output a committee that is not
o(
√
K)-approximately stable.
Proof. Consider the following example (illustrated in Figure 1 where each rectangle is a candidate
whose projection on x-axis corresponds to the voters who approve her): The set of voters is divided
into two equal-sized disjoint sets NL and NR. There are 4 different sets of candidates:
1. Set A: There are P2 (P is a parameter related to K to be set later) candidates in A. The
voters who approve a candidate in A are exactly those voters in NL.
2. Set B: There are P2 candidates in B. The voters who approve a candidate in B are exactly
those voters in NR.
3. Set C: There are P2 · P4 candidates in C. Voters in NR do not approve candidates in C. Every
candidate in C is approved by NLP/4 voters. Each voter in NL approves P2 candidates in C.
4. Set D: There are P2 candidates in D. Voters in NL do not approve candidates in D. Every
candidate in D is approved by NRP/2 voters. Each voter in NR approves one candidate in D.
Consider running the PAV rule on this instance when K = P + P
2
8 . PAV will first choose all
candidates in A and B. Note that at this point, any candidate in C has marginal contribution at
least 1P · NLP/4 , while any candidate in D has marginal contribution at most 1(P/2)+1 · NRP/2 , which is
strictly smaller. Therefore, PAV will select the committee S = A ∪B ∪C.
However, voters in NR can form a coalition and deviate to committee S′ = B ∪D. All voters
in NR are better off, thus V (S, S′) = |NR| = n2 . For PAV to be ǫ-approximately stable, we need
n
2
≤ (1 + ǫ) |S
′|
K
· n = (1 + ǫ)P
K
· n .
Since K = P + P
2
8 , we need ǫ = Ω(
√
K).
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Figure 1: PAV cannot be better than O(
√
K)-approximately stable.
4 Conclusions
We view our results as a first step in understanding the general notion of stability for committee
selection problems. We conclude with several open questions. The first major open question is the
existence of deterministic stable committees in the Approval set setting, generalizing our positive
result for K = 3 to general K. We conjecture that such a stable committee always exists. Via
computer-assisted search, we have shown that this conjecture holds for small numbers of voters and
candidates (m+n ≤ 14). However, as we have seen, existing voting rules seem incapable of finding
such a committee, which makes this question very tantalizing.
The next open question is whether a stable lottery exists for ordinal preferences over committees
that result from more general cardinal preferences. Our “holy grail” is to have one algorithm that
finds a stable lottery using ordinal preferences over committees, that works for a wide range of
underlying cardinal utilities. One immediate extension of our work will be to the case where the
utility of a voter is additive in the set of candidates in the committee. An obvious approach for
attacking this problem is to extend Lemma 1 to the case where Yi ∼ Bernoulli(si, pi), but this will
require new ideas.
Finally, our algorithm for L-stable lotteries has running time that depends on mL. Though this
is not an issue for Ranking, it would be good to remove this dependence for approval set and
develop a poly-time algorithm for any L, or show that this is not possible.
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